Autonomy and The Paradox of Self-Creation:  Infinite Regresses, Finite Selves, and the Limits of Authenticity by Noggle, Robert
Autonomy and the Paradox of Self-Creation: 




In James Stacey Taylor ed., Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy
Cambridge University Press, 2008

1. Introduction
The political state of autonomy has proven to be a compelling metaphor for the condition in which a person is under his or her own control, master of his or her own destiny. The political metaphor suggests that personal autonomy is a condition in which one is not ruled over by external forces. However, there is another dimension to personal autonomy. This is the idea of government by the legitimate authority. A usurper takes power from within the state, rather than conquering it from the outside. Likewise, psychological forces can usurp power from a person. Just as a person can lose control to external forces such as coercion or peer pressure, so too can s/he lose control to internal forces.
	Apparent examples of internal forces that may threaten to usurp control from its rightful locus include addictions, obsessive-compulsive disorder, pathological gambling, kleptomania, and strong phobias. For those who prefer more fanciful examples, the philosophical literature on autonomy also includes scenarios involving desires implanted through psychological conditioning, hypnosis, brainwashing, futuristic psychosurgery, and (that old favorite) supernatural intervention. Such forces may seem “alien” or “ego dystonic” because they do not issue from the person’s goals, values, and beliefs. Although they come from inside her own head, so to speak, they are not experienced as being part of “who she really is.” She seems to be the victim whom they afflict rather than their author. This sense of affliction or alienation is often expressed in more everyday language by a certain special use of the term “self.”  Thus, a person in the grip of an addiction might explain his behavior by saying that “he is not himself.”  Philosophers reflect this usage when they say that such forces are not part of the true or real self of the person who is afflicted by them. This sense of the term “self” refers to an especially significant subset of the person’s psychology. According to this usage, the person’s self does not include those internal but phenomenologically alien forces that may afflict her and threaten her personal autonomy. The adjective “authentic” is commonly applied to elements of the person’s psychology that are part of or produced by this true or real self.​[1]​ Thus, to say that an impulse is not authentic is to say that it does not lie within that part of a person’s psychology that must be in charge if she is to be genuinely autonomous (or that must be the source of her actions if they are to count as autonomous). Depending on how we fill out the theory of autonomy, it is possible that a person’s behavior could be caused by authentic elements of her psychology without her being autonomous. For example, coercion may be thought to rob an agent of autonomy, even though the coerced agent’s behavior may be caused by authentic desires (e.g., to avoid harm). On most accounts, acting from authentic motivations is a necessary but not sufficient condition for personal autonomy.

2. The Question of Authenticity
A theory of authenticity will determine what must be true of an element of a person’s psychology (typically a desire) in order for it to be true that, if that element is in control of the person’s activity, the activity may count as autonomous. Thus, a theory of authenticity can be seen as beginning with the following base clause:

Element (or set of elements) E1 of the psychology of person S is authentic if . . . 

Such a theory will then add at least one condition to fill in the antecedent. A great many specific theories about how to do this have emerged. Most propose conditions that fit one of three schemata:

Structural Condition Schema:  E1 is related in the right way to E2, where E2 is some other element (or group of elements) of S’s psychology.

	Historical Condition Schema:  E1 arose in the right way.

Substantive Condition Schema:  E1 has the right content or causes S to believe, desire, intend, or do the right things.


3. Authenticity and the Regress Problem
In this section, I will discuss the three types of conditions for authenticity, and their susceptibility to the most pervasive objection in the philosophical literature on personal autonomy. Although I will treat them as separate conditions, a particular theory of authenticity may include more than one of them. This possibility should not affect the substance of my remarks, however. 

3.1. Structural Conditions
Structural conditions define the authenticity of one element of a person’s psychology in terms of its relationship to some other element of that same person’s psychology.  Two forms of structural condition have been prominent in the literature: higher-order desire conditions and partitioning conditions.

3.1.1. Higher-order Desires
The higher-order desire (HOD) approach to authenticity arose from seminal work by Gerald Dworkin and Harry Frankfurt in the early 1970s.​[2]​ Its basic idea can be illustrated by one of Frankfurt’s favorite examples, the unwilling addict. Such an addict suffers a lack of autonomy because she acts upon a desire that she desires to be rid of. The desire to use the drug is a first-order desire, while the desire not to have that desire is a second-order desire. When a person has both a first-order desire and a second-order desire not to have the first-order desire, Frankfurt writes that this repudiated first-order desire is properly regarded as “a force other than his own.”​[3]​ By contrast, when an agent endorses, or desires to have, a particular desire, he thereby makes that desire “more truly his own” and “identifies himself” with it.​[4]​ In other words, a desire that is repudiated by a higher order desire is inauthentic, while a desire that is either endorsed by a higher order desire or at least not repudiated by one is authentic. Thus, for example, my desire to write a book on autonomy is authentic because it is a desire that I want to have. In contrast, my desire to take a nap right now is inauthentic because I want it to go away.
	Frankfurt noticed that just as we can ask whether an ordinary desire or impulse is authentic, we can ask the same question about a second-order desire. For second-order desires can themselves result from brainwashing, psychological conditioning, or mental disorders that seem inconsistent with authenticity. If a second-order desire is itself inauthentic, one naturally wonders how it could confer authenticity on a desire that it endorses. The natural response is to claim that a second-order desire must be authentic in order for it to determine the authenticity of a first-order desire. However, this response seems to require that we posit a third-order desire to determine whether the second-order desire is authentic. But, of course, nothing prevents us from raising the same question about the authenticity of this third-order desire, and to settle it by positing a fourth-order desire, and so on ad infinitum. Frankfurt realized that this potential for an infinite regress was a problem. His proposal was to introduce a somewhat mysterious notion of a “decisive commitment” that “‘resounds’ through the potentially endless array of higher order desires.”​[5]​  
	Frankfurt’s critics were quick to criticize this proposal. Collectively, their criticisms came to be known as the “regress problem.” This problem first arises when we ask about the authenticity of the second order-desire that endorses (and thus authenticates) the first-order desire. If we answer that question in the same way we answered the question about the authentication of the first-order desire, we simply move the problem back a step, and if we keep doing this, the regress ensues. To avoid the regress, then, we seem to need a different way to ground the authenticity of the highest order desire in the chain, and thus to make it a fit candidate to authenticate the next highest desire, which can now authenticate the next highest desire, and so on down the line. This is what Frankfurt’s notion of a decisive commitment was supposed to provide.
	However, many critics found this proposal less than satisfying. Frankfurt’s “decisive commitment” seemed either to be or to be caused by another desire.​[6]​ Thus, it would seem that this commitment, or the desire that causes it, could be either authentic or inauthentic. If it is authentic, then the theory needs to explain what makes it authentic (and, of course, if the explanation makes reference to some other desire, then the regress threatens again). If it is inauthentic, then we have what John Christman calls the “ab initio problem.”​[7]​ This problem arises when we make the seemingly implausible claim that a psychological element or process that lacks authenticity can nevertheless impart authenticity to some other element or process.
	The regress problem has played a major role in shaping philosophical work on autonomy from the early 1970s onward. Some philosophers attempted to modify the “pure” HOD theory by positing some additional condition that the highest-order desire could fulfill so that it would not need an even higher-order desire to confer authenticity on it. Others responded by rejecting the HOD theory outright. Early on, a partitioning condition -- our next topic -- was suggested as a potential replacement.
	
3.1.2. Partitions
Partitioning conditions for authenticity claim that a desire, decision, belief, or other mental element can be authentic in virtue of its being related in a certain way (to be spelled out by the theory) to some more or less distinct psychological structure within the person.
	The most influential example of the partitioning approach to autonomy/authenticity was proposed by Gary Watson in 1985.​[8]​ Watson partitions the “springs of actions” into two systems. A person’s motivational system consists of “that set of considerations which move him to action.”​[9]​ The evaluational system “assigns values to states of affairs” and consists of “those principles and ends which he -- in a cool and non-self-deceptive moment -- articulates as definitive of the good, fulfilling and desirable life.”​[10]​ Watson links this evaluative system with what we are calling the authentic self, writing that “one cannot coherently dissociate oneself from it in its entirety . . ..”​[11]​ Normally, the desires produced by the motivational system are in “harmony” with the contents of the evaluational system. But it is possible for a desire produced by the motivational system to conflict with the contents of the evaluational system. When this happens, Watson says that the person is “estranged” from the desire; in our terms, this desire is inauthentic. 
	Given that Watson offered an early a version of the regress argument against Frankfurt’s theory, it is perhaps ironic to find that his own theory is susceptible to much the same problem. Just as we can imagine an inauthentic HOD, we can also imagine cases in which an element within the evaluative system seems inauthentic. For instance, a value implanted via surreptitious or involuntary processes like psychological conditioning by a mad scientist, brainwashing by a religious cult, or indoctrination by a totalitarian state, would certainly seem inauthentic, especially if it is contrary to the agent’s original values. We can even imagine cases in which a person’s entire “evaluational system” arose from such processes.​[12]​
	Now if we assume that elements of an evaluational system can authenticate a motive only if they are themselves authentic, then a regress seems to be in the offing. This regress is structurally isomorphic to the one confronting Frankfurt’s theory. In both cases, the theory claims that a desire is authentic only if it bears a certain relation to some other psychological element, either a higher-order desire or an "evaluational system."  The problem that makes the regress infinite is simply that the authenticator seems to need an authenticator.
	This problem generalizes. For any attempt to locate a mental element or structure that can render other elements authentic, it seems possible to imagine that this new element or structure is as clearly inauthentic as any mental element ever is. At the very least, we can always imagine a science-fiction scenario in which the new element or structure has been implanted by a nefarious neurosurgeon, cult, or demon, against the wishes of the victim. The defender of the theory now faces a dilemma: she can either make the seemingly implausible claim that even an element or structure of that sort can impart authenticity; or posit some psychological element to confer authenticity, only to face the same kind of apparent counter-example as before.​[13]​

3.1.3. The Ab Initio Requirement: The Regress Made Insoluble
For both kinds of structural conditions, the regress problem begins when we ask whether the mental element (E2) that is supposed to impart authenticity to some other mental element (E1) is itself authentic. Evidently, we can always imagine a scenario in which the proposed authenticator (E2) has features that make it seem to be inauthentic. If we regard it as implausible for an inauthentic element to impart authenticity to another element, then we will need to guarantee that this proposed authenticator (E2) is itself authentic before we can be sure that it can impart authenticity to some other element (E1). And this need will tempt us to posit yet another authenticator, the authenticity of which can then be questioned, and so on.
	The force driving this regress is a seductive assumption about what must be the case if a psychological element is to impart authenticity to some other psychological element. In a passage laying out his version of the regress problem, Christman characterizes one of the horns of the dilemma as “the ab initio problem,” which he elucidates by asking, “how can a desire be autonomous [authentic] if it was formed or evaluated by a process that was not itself autonomous.”​[14]​ Of course, this could be a legitimate request for an explanation, but the context of the question suggests that it may be meant as a rhetorical device to call attention to the apparent implausibility of an inauthentic process giving rise to an authentic product. 
	Similar suggestions appear throughout the literature on autonomy. Thus, Marilyn Friedman writes of “the old adage that like comes from like; autonomy is not expected to emerge out of processes which are not autonomous, not a person’s ‘own’ to begin with”​[15]​ Stefaan Cuypers writes, “How can there be autonomy without autonomous foundations?”​[16]​ Laura Ekstrom either assumes or attributes to Frankfurt the claim that “the second-order desire can confer internality [authenticity] only if it is internal to the self [authentic].”​[17]​ The general principle suggested in these passages seems to be that if a psychological element is to confer authenticity on some other psychological element, then it must be authentic. For convenience, we may label this the “ab initio requirement.” It is a putative requirement on theories of authenticity that they not rest authenticity on inauthentic foundations or derive it from inauthentic sources.
	Now, if we can always imagine a case in which it is implausible to regard a given psychological element as authentic, the question of the authenticity of an authenticating element can always be raised. If we accept the ab initio requirement, we must give an affirmative answer to that question if the element is to serve as an authenticator. Evidently, the attempt to define the authenticity of one psychological element in terms of its relationship to some other element, together with the ab initio requirement, generates a regress. No finite chain of authenticating elements can provide an account of how any element is made authentic, since no element can be the last member of the chain if every member must be authenticated by some other element.
	The susceptibility of structural theories to the regress problem might suggest either that an otherwise structural theory will need to include a supplementary non-structural condition, or that we should abandon structural conditions all together. Historical conditions–our next topic–have been popular both as supplements and as alternatives to structural conditions for authenticity.

3.2. Historical Conditions
Historical conditions claim that an element of a person’s psychology is authentic if it arose in the right way–the nature of which will be spelled out by the particular theory. Gerald Dworkin offers the following example of a historical condition: the “right way” for an element to arise is under conditions of "procedural independence," which he characterizes by offering examples of conditions that do not count: “hypnotic suggestion, manipulation, coercive persuasion, subliminal influence, and so forth.”​[18]​ John Christman offers a somewhat more subjective condition: a desire is authentic if it arose by a process to which the person did not object or would not have objected if she had attended to it.​[19]​
	Although specific formulations vary somewhat, the motivating idea behind historical conditions seems to be that a psychological element is authentic if its history is free of the kinds of influences–especially external influences–that seem to undermine authenticity. Because historical conditions make the authenticity of an element depend on its own history, they seem to avoid the regress of authenticating elements. Without the requirement of another element to serve as an authentic authenticator, the regress seems to lack a place to get started.
	However, I think that this appearance that historical conditions are regress-proof is illusory. To see why, we have to think more about the “right way” for an element to be generated. Most proponents of historical conditions attempt to characterize the “wrong way” for a psychological element to arise. They generally do this by ruling out certain kinds of external forces in the etiology of authentic elements, either by name or by description.
	Although it is difficult to characterize these forces precisely, I think it is fair to say that they all involve processes in which the agent’s own psychology is not involved at all, or at least not involved in a robust, controlling way. This suggests that, whatever the right way is, it will involve elements of the agent’s own psychology. The underlying intuition behind this approach seems to be that, in the absence of external interference or other authenticity-undermining processes, a person’s psychological elements are free to develop in such a way as to reflect the Real Self.​[20]​ If S herself was not involved in the right way in the generation of E1, then it is difficult to see how E1 could be plausibly regarded as authentic, given that the core notion of authenticity has to do with belonging to the self. The “right way” for E1 to be created will evidently have to be some process that involves elements of S’s own psychology. Thus, it seems that we can, without distortion, rewrite most, if not all, historical conditions for authenticity as follows:

Revised Historical Condition Schema:  E1 arose in the right way from E2, where E2 is one or more element(s) or configuration(s) of elements of S’s psychology.

In this way, we can see that the historical condition preserves the idea that authenticity requires a psychological element to have the right relationship to some element of the person’s own psychology, which we may take to be a more or less literal “real self.” Thus, we might say that both historical and structural theories are, so to speak, “self-referential” in that they define the authenticity of an element by its connection to the self. On this view, the self is, by definition, the determiner of authenticity or inauthenticity, since the authenticity of a psychological element depends on its relationship to the self. In the context of a self-referential theory, this authenticating self -- however exactly it may be conceived -- is the source of authenticity.
	When we express the historical condition in this fuller way, we can see how the ab initio requirement does, in fact, apply to it. For if authenticity can arise only from something that already has it, then in order for an element (E1) to be authentic, any other element (E2) involved in its genesis must also be authentic. And, of course, the ab initio requirement also implies that these earlier elements can be authentic only if the elements that caused them are also authentic. Thus, if the authenticity of any psychological element or configuration requires that it arise from authentic earlier elements or configurations, then we face an infinite regress of earlier and earlier elements or configurations, each of which must have arisen only from authentic elements or configurations. It is precisely because historical conditions, once unpacked, have the same “self-referential” form as structural conditions that they fall prey to the same regress problem. The ab initio requirement apparently guarantees a regress in any authenticity condition that requires one psychological element or configuration of elements to be authenticated by another, whether it is contemporaneous with it or temporally earlier.
	In its “synchronic” or contemporaneous form, such a regress is a problem because we do not have an infinite number of psychological elements ready to serve as authenticators to authenticators to authenticators. . . . In its “diachronic” or historical form, the regress is a problem because of the obvious fact that we lack infinitely long psychological histories. As we move back in time, we eventually reach a point at which our psychological configurations no longer even exist. And well before then, we find psychological causes that involve processes (often lumped together under the broad heading of “socialization”) like conditioning, role model imitation, the internalization of socially-endorsed behavioral norms, and the acceptance of claims on the basis of adult authority. Such processes are paradigmatic of the kind of external manipulation or “brainwashing” that normally seems to undercut autonomy and impart inauthentic attitudes. ​[21]​

3.3 Substantive Conditions
As we saw in the previous section, the combination of self-referentiality and the ab initio requirement makes both structural and historical conditions susceptible to the regress problem. If we take this problem seriously, we might be tempted to abandon self-referential conditions in favor of a condition that proposes a more objective criterion for the authenticity of a mental element.​[22]​ Such conditions make the authenticity of an element depend on its relationship to some substantive criterion such as truth, goodness, appropriateness, etc.
	While I cannot mount a comprehensive critique of substantive conditions here, I do want to sketch briefly what I see as the most serious drawback with this approach.​[23]​ As I see it, this approach risks conflating authenticity/autonomy with some other notion–such as moral agency, rationality, or some sort of mental health. Such an approach changes the question, I think, from one about the person’s relation to one of her own psychological elements to the question of whether the element, in itself, exemplifies some other property that has nothing to do with the person to whom it belongs. In so doing a substantive condition abandons the idea of authenticity as involving being a part or product of the person’s own self rather than a usurping psychological force. I believe that we should have very compelling reasons before adopting an analysis of a concept that changes the concept into something else.
	Of course, if self-referential conditions turn out to be incoherent or otherwise defective, that would count as a compelling reason. Now it may be thought that the regress problem renders the self-referential approach to authenticity conceptually incoherent. I will argue, though, that the regress problem is driven by an assumption–the ab initio requirement–that we have compelling reasons to reject.

4. The Problem with the Regress Problem
The problem with the ab initio requirement is that it requires a self-creating self that could never exist. Or, to put the point another way, if we accept that the self cannot be the cause of its own existence, then we must deny the ab initio requirement. And clearly we must accept that the self is not self-creating, if for no other reason than that complete self-creation is impossible. This is because complete self-creation would require the truth of two contradictory propositions: first, that the self-creating thing exists, which seems to be necessary for it to do anything, such as create something, and second, that the thing does not exist, which must be true in order for it to require to be created. Thus, barring backward-causation and temporal loops, true self-creation seems to be a conceptual impossibility, except, perhaps, for God.
	Now if the self cannot be the cause of its own creation, and if it has not been around forever, then we know that the self must have arisen from something that is not the self. Thus, if a self is possible at all, and if it has a finite history, then it must at some point arise from materials and forces that are not the self, and which are, therefore, inauthentic. Consequently, the elements of this initial self also must have arisen from something that was not authentic. Now, ex hypothesi, these elements are parts of the initial self; this fact, together with the core intuition that authenticity has to do with belonging to the self, implies that they are in fact authentic. This implies that a psychological element can be authentic even though it arises from  non-authentic sources. Thus, if the ab initio requirement is valid, then either the self is self-creating, or the self has an infinitely long history, or the existence of the self is simply impossible, or being an element of the self does not make that element authentic. Since none of the claims expressed in the disjuncts of the consequent are especially plausible, we have good reason to reject the antecedent, that is, the ab initio requirement.

5. Recalcitrant Intuitions
The familiar story has it that, after delivering a public lecture on cosmology, Bertrand Russell encountered an elderly woman who objected to the contemporary theory and offered an alternative: The surface of the earth, she asserted, is really the curved back of a giant turtle. When asked what the turtle was standing on, she replied that it was standing on the back of another, larger turtle. When asked what that turtle stands on, she replied, “you can’t trick me, young man–it’s turtles all the way down.” The ab initio requirement generates an infinite regress of “turtles,” for it requires each authentic turtle to stand on the back of another authentic turtle. To jettison the ab initio requirement is to realize that for finite beings like us, “all the way down” is a finite distance, and that there is a bottom turtle which must stand on something that is not itself a turtle. 
	Ironically, most philosophers who have posed the regress problem in debates about autonomy recognize, and have often explicitly acknowledged, that ultimate self-creation is impossible. I suspect that the reason why regress arguments are so gripping is that the ab initio requirement -- even when we do not consciously endorse it as a general principle -- tends to drive our intuitions about specific theoretical proposals so as to produce much the same effect as it would if we did explicitly endorse it. To mix metaphors, any attempt to terminate the regress of elements within a self-referential theory will seem intuitively to be too much like pulling an authentic rabbit out of an inauthentic hat. For it will necessarily label at least one element (or configuration of elements) authentic despite the fact that it is not authenticated by any other authentic element(s) (or configurations of elements). Whatever condition is offered to authenticate this “bottom turtle,” our knee-jerk intuition is likely to be that this is really the job for yet another turtle. And that intuition can only be strengthened by constructing fanciful brainwashing and supernatural intervention scenarios to manipulate the ground on which the bottom turtle stands, so as to make it seem too shaky to support any turtle at all. And imagining that the origin of the first authentic element must involve an immediate and sudden transition in which completely inauthentic causes give rise to a completely authentic element makes the intuition stronger still. If we trust these intuitions, we will end up rejecting any attempt to cut off the regress–perhaps without ever realizing that if we generalize these intuitions, we end up with an ab initio requirement that we have good reason to reject.
	Marilyn Friedman calls the idea underlying the ab initio requirement an “old adage.”  I would be more inclined to label it a superstition, for I think that, like any robust superstition, this one may continue to influence our intuitions even when we recognize that it is bunk. As long as the ab initio superstition continues to exercise this covert influence, I suspect that we will continue to lack a convincing theory of authenticity, precisely because our intuitions will only be satisfied by something that nothing can possibly be.​[24]​  
	The forgoing is, of course, merely armchair psychology. And my “patients” (academic philosophers) are particularly challenging. So it is quite possible that the diagnosis I have sketched does not apply to my current patient. Be that as it may, it still seems to be a sufficiently dangerous syndrome to merit attention. It certainly would help to explain why philosophers working in this area have been so quick to dismiss as counterintuitive any proposed solution to the regress problem. In any case, I think that it shows that we must be suspicious of the feeling that an attempt to terminate the regress in a self-referential theory of authenticity is intuitively implausible–simply because it derives the authentic from the inauthentic.

6. Who’s Afraid of the Big, Bad Regress?  
As we saw, rejecting the ab initio requirement frees us from the need for an infinite regress of “turtles,” that could never be instantiated by beings for whom “all the way down” is a finite distance. It is worth noting that just as we should reject the generalized ab initio requirement that requires an infinite “tower of turtles,” so too we should reject any particular theory of authenticity that makes the same sort of infinite “tower of turtles” a requirement for authenticity. Hence, cutting off any regress that a theory of authenticity may generate should be a high priority for the theory’s defenders. Had the ab initio requirement been valid, however, such a regress would be inevitable for any self-referential theory, and terminating it would render such a theory implausible. That would have put any self-referential theory into an insoluble Catch-22. But once we reject the ab initio requirement (and the intuitions that it may covertly spawn), terminating the regress becomes more like trimming an unruly hedge than like defeating an invincible opponent -- difficult, perhaps, but not one that requires a self that can somehow serve as the cause of its own creation. To avoid the regress problem, a theory must not make meeting a self-referential condition necessary for an element to be authentic, even if it claims that meeting such a requirement is a sufficient condition and the one that most authentic elements fulfill. Thus, a self-referential theory apparently must leave open the possibility of another means by which authenticity can arise besides having it be conferred by some other element that is already authentic. Of course, doing so raises new questions: Just how can authenticity arise from states or processes that cannot be plausibly regarded as being authentic already? If we accept that there is a bottom turtle standing on something that is not itself a turtle, the question becomes, “What is the bottom turtle standing upon?”

7. The Authenticating Self’s Inauthentic Origins
So how does the authenticating self first arise?  The smart-alecky answer is just “gradually.”  I’ll elaborate: it seems clear to me that the self emerges gradually via incremental processes of psychological development during childhood. While the full details of these processes are the proper domain of psychology rather than philosophy, I will nevertheless exercise the philosophers’ prerogative to do some armchair psychology.
	I begin with what seems to be a near consensus among philosophers working on autonomy, namely the idea that whatever else the self must have, if it is to ground assertions of authenticity, it must have a stable, orderly, belief-system and preference structure, and it must have the psychological mechanisms necessary to allow it to reflect upon and revise those beliefs and desires.
	A person’s beliefs and desires are, I speculate, structured around a core which consists of those beliefs which constitute her most basic cognitive organizing principles and fundamental assumptions and convictions, together with the desires that constitute her deepest, most significant goals, concerns, commitments, and values. Taken together, these core attitudes form a kind of skeleton for the rest of her psychological structure. In so doing, they form the basis and the ultimate court of appeal for the reflective self-adjustment that allows the self to react and develop in response to changing conditions, improved information, and increasing self-awareness. These core attitudes form a relatively stable framework for the agent’s psychology; they play a key role in making the person who she is and giving shape to the rest of her psychological elements. Collectively, they determine what her life is all about, and what is important to her; they give shape and contour to her way of looking at, and being in, the world. In a very significant sense, they make her who she is. They may be thought of as forming the wellsprings of higher-order desires, or the values of which Watson speaks, or the “character system” of which Laura Ekstrom writes.​[25]​
	In addition to a skeleton of core attitudes, the fully formed self has the ability to adjust and revise its own attitudes. Of course it does not usually do this for no reason at all. When it alters its beliefs, it generally does so on the basis of perceptions and various kinds of reasoning processes (not all of which may be conscious, and not all of which may be sound). Generally speaking, the more peripheral a belief is, the more likely it is to be changed in light of new information, new reasoning, or conflicts with other beliefs. Changes to peripheral desires (especially when these are instrumental) are normally occasioned by changes in circumstances, new information, or new episodes of practical reasoning. Peripheral desires tend to be altered fairly easily, in part because they often rest on beliefs about means and ends which are themselves subject to revision. Peripheral attitudes, then, tend to be relatively flexible, and to change fairly rapidly to reflect new situations and new information.
	 Core attitudes, on the other hand, tend to remain relatively stable over time. However, they are not necessarily permanent, nor do they form an  “exclusive club.”  Over time, new attitudes can be admitted into their ranks, and current members can be expelled. Often, such changes are, to a large degree, “internally motivated” in such a way that they seem to be intelligible reflections of the contents of the core attitudes. Such changes resolve contradictions, inconsistencies, or other kinds of tension among core attitudes, or between a core attitude and persistent information about oneself or the outside world. When changes to the core attitudes are of this kind, the self evolves according to its own internal logic–its own contents determine whether and how it is to change in response to new information, internal conflicts, and changing conditions. While outside forces or external circumstances may occasion such a change, its direction and nature are largely determined by the actual contents of the core attitudes.​[26]​
	When psychological changes happen this way, it seems correct to say that the new configuration of the self is an authentic continuation of the previous configuration. On the other hand, a psychological change–especially a change to her core attitudes–that does not occur in this way produces a new configuration that is not an authentic continuation of the previous one. Such changes are not driven by the contents of the core attitudes, and thus are not caused in the right way to count as internally motivated. Changes caused by sudden organic trauma, or by nefarious brain surgery, might fall into this category, for they might change the attitudes that form the core of the self in ways that do not reflect their contents. If the changes are radical enough, it might be proper to speak of the destruction of one self and its replacement by a new one.
	How does such a first self arise? Infants and very young children do not yet have the two key psychological ingredients for the kind of self that we are supposing is the determiner of authenticity. The infant’s cognitive structures and capacities are unformed, and her motivational system consists mainly of unstructured biological drives. As the child grows, she begins to develop cognitive structures around which she will organize her beliefs, as well as the stable concerns, attachments, and goals that will provide structure to her motivational system. Together, these will gradually coalesce to form the core of her self. The earliest core desires, as well as the initial elements of the child’s cognitive conceptual scheme, arise via processes that would be considered authenticity-undermining if they were used to implant beliefs and desires into an adult. Such processes apparently include operant, aversive, and classical conditioning, role model imitation, blind obedience to and subsequent internalization of behavioral norms, uncritical acceptance of propositions on the authority of parents and teachers, and so on. Out of a seemingly unpromising beginning -- a sort of chaotic psychological “soup” -- the child’s self gradually emerges as her cognitive and motivational systems develop the kind of structure and stability, and the rational and reflective capacities, necessary for the existence of a coherent and stable self that can be the source of authenticity.​[27]​
	If we think of the structure and origins of the authenticating self along these lines -- and for our present purposes the general outlines matter more than the details -- then it becomes relatively easy to see how it could arise gradually from a psychological configuration that does not yet have the properties that are characteristic of the fully developed authenticating self. For the key features of the self -- structure and capacity -- are both features that can admit of degrees and that therefore can arise gradually.​[28]​ As with all gradual processes, it will, of course, be difficult to know what to say while it is going on (just as it is difficult to know when a balding man has gone bald). But a theory that characterizes the authenticating self in this way will have no conceptual problem with the claim that the self develops gradually. In this way, we can see how an authentic rabbit gradually emerges from an inauthentic hat.

8. Soothing Bruised Intuitions
If we claim that authentic selves emerge from a disorganized and undeveloped psychological quagmire, helped along by processes that would otherwise count as subversive to authenticity, we may not derive much comfort from the fact that this is the kind of origin our own selves had. In addition, we have only to imagine cases in which such processes go awry to wonder whether we really can pull an authentic rabbit out of an inauthentic hat after all. I want to conclude by looking in some detail at the kinds of scenario that pose the greatest intuitive hurdle for attempts to halt the regress that threatens self-referential theories of authenticity. The kind of example I have in mind involves manipulation that runs deep. How deep?  All the way down, both temporally and structurally. Bottom turtle manipulation. Consider, then, two thought experiments, both of which are composites of several cases discussed in various places in the literature.

Edgar the Evil is the son of a crime a boss who raises him to follow in his footsteps. Using standard child-rearing techniques, he encourages Edgar’s more selfish and violent impulses, and discourages empathy and compassion. As Edgar reaches adulthood, he is quite thoroughly evil.

Oppressed Olivia has been raised (using standard child-rearing techniques) to abide by and adopt the sexist attitudes of the patriarchal society in which she lives. Consequently, she shapes her ideals, aspirations, and activities in ways that reflect these attitudes. As Olivia reaches adulthood, her convictions include beliefs in the naturalness of women’s subservient role, and her deepest aspiration is to a housewife.

	Such cases attempt to undermine our willingness to allow the bottom turtle to stand on anything that is not itself a turtle. It is perhaps worth recalling that “standard child-rearing techniques” include such processes as operant, aversive, and classical conditioning, role model imitation, blind obedience to and subsequent internalization of behavioral norms, uncritical acceptance of propositions on the authority of parents and teachers, and so on. Given that such processes are the origin of their attitudes, we might ask: “How can we really say that the attitudes Edgar and Olivia have are authentic?”
	If we ask the question this way, though, I think that we risk giving in to the temptation posed by the intuitions that arise from the ab initio superstition. Moreover, I think this way of asking the question misunderstands the logic of the concept of authenticity. We sometimes speak imprecisely of authenticity as though it were a simple one-place predicate. We must keep in mind, though, that it is really a two place relation: Some element is authentic to a particular person, and if we accept a self-referential condition of authenticity, an element is authentic to a person just in case it bears the right relation to her true self. Before the self initially arises, there is no other self for the initial self to bear any authenticity-grounding relation to. Viewed in this way, it is meaningless to ask whether the initial self that arises in Edward or Olivia is authentic. When that initial self forms, it is the only self that there is. Sadly, that initial self is the only game in town, so to speak. Now if we ask whether some element of that initial self is authentic, then the answer simply has to be “yes.”  After all, the element belongs, ex hypothesi, to the only self that exists. If the self is fully formed, and if the elements are related to it in the right way (with the right way depending on what theory of authenticity we finally adopt), then that is all there is to their being authentic. Hence, Edgar’s evil life-plans, and Olivia’s subservient aspirations, are authentic.
	We might be tempted to note that a different self could have emerged in each of these cases. Indeed, it is likely that better selves would have emerged in Edgar and Olivia but for the warped upbringing to which they were subjected. But while we can certainly posit such a counterfactual self, it is difficult to see how a self that, ex hypothesi, is non-existent can be anyone’s real self. Such a self does not now exist, nor did it ever exist. As I have told the stories, no other self ever emerged from their childhoods. Unfortunately, each of the selves that did emerge formed around a core that includes attitudes that are factually and morally defective. But if the question of authenticity is a question about what beliefs and desires are truly a person’s own, then it is difficult to see any basis for the claim that these beliefs and desires do not belong to the self that arises from Edgar’s and Olivia’s childhood.​[29]​
	But isn’t there just something about these cases that doesn’t “set well”?  Haven’t Edgar and Olivia been brainwashed into having evil or oppressive attitudes?  Perhaps, but then the only real difference between them and us is that we were brainwashed into having less dysfunctional attitudes (or if not, then we have at least been better able to leave ours behind). We must keep in mind that acknowledging that theses attitudes are authentic (to Olivia and Edgar) does not require us to abandon our moral outrage at the fact that they have warped, corrupted, and stifled the development of these two people. We simply need to articulate that outrage a bit more carefully. It is not that the earliest socialization of a child into an evil or oppressive world-view imprisons some better self. For there is no self at all before the socialization that initially creates it. But saying that evil or oppressive attitudes are authentic to someone who has them does not make them any less evil or oppressive. 
	Of course, these elements of the initial self did arise through processes that we normally think of as having the capacity to undermine authenticity. And certainly if we were to use such processes to implant impulses or attitudes into a person who already has an existing authentic self, then it would make sense to ask whether those new impulses or elements are authentic to that self. And, depending on the details of the case, we may conclude that they are not.
	In other words, it makes a great deal of difference whether such processes are being used to build an initial self, or whether they are being used to implant psychological elements into an existing self. For in the latter case, we can ask whether such implantation preserves the self that is already there. We can ask, in short, whether the self that results from the implantation is an authentic descendent of the earlier self. But when there is no earlier self, such questions are meaningless. To see the contrast, consider one final case:

Brainwashed Ben was raised Catholic; his upbringing is such that his religious beliefs help to define who he is. Craving a vegetarian meal, he attends a free dinner put on by a local cult. The cult slips psychoactive drugs into Ben’s couscous, and these facilitate subsequent brainwashing. The techniques include many of the same processes used to socialize young children. These non-rational means root out Ben’s Catholic world-view and replace it with that of the cult. This brainwashing is sufficiently radical to count as the replacement of Ben’s earlier core self with a new one.

Now, what are we to say about the new elements of Ben’s psychology? Are they authentic or not?  That depends on what self we are talking about. If we assume that the brainwashing has been sufficiently thorough to count as the implantation of a new self into Ben’s psychological make-up, then it would be accurate to say that the elements of the cult world-view are authentic to this new self. Of course, these elements are not authentic to Ben’s prior self. Suppose, on the other hand, that a few of the old Catholic habits remain. Despite the cult’s commitment to vegetarianism, Ben gets an irresistible craving for fish on Fridays. Presumably, this craving was authentic to Ben’s original, Catholic self. However, it might be properly regarded as inauthentic to his new, cult self. 	The contrast between Ben’s case and the cases of Olivia and Edgar reveal something important. There is, it seems, a big difference between the application of brainwashing and related techniques to a person with a fully formed self and the application of very similar techniques during the early stages of child rearing. In both cases, we create a self. But in the former case, we create a self by destroying an already existing one. 
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